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MEMORANDUM
TO: OPINION
LEADERS FROM:
TOM DONNELLY,
Deputy Executive Director SUBJECT: Iraq George W. Bush came
to office declaring he would “defend America’s interests in
the Persian Gulf” by reviving “the vision” of his father’s
“Gulf War coalition.” But more was promised. Defense Secretary
Donald Rumsfeld and Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz were signatories to
a May 1998 letter, sponsored by the Project for the New American Century,
calling for the establishment of a provisional, free government in those
areas of northern and southern Iraq not under Saddam’s control. The
letter also argued that U.S. and allied military forces should be prepared
to support the Iraqi opposition and “be prepared…to help remove
Saddam from power.” Likewise, the Republican Party platform demanded
“a comprehensive plan for the removal of Saddam Hussein from power.” It now appears that
those campaign promises aren’t likely to be fulfilled. Although the
Bush Administration is in the midst of what is supposed to be a thoroughgoing
review of policy toward Iraq, the outcome is close to a foregone conclusion.
The sanctions imposed upon Iraq after Operation Desert Storm are in shreds,
and the UN this week would not even allow the fiction of an orderly American
retreat under the flag of “smart sanctions.” Saddam already
is earning enough to revive his missile and weapons of mass destruction
programs and UN inspectors were ejected from Iraq years ago. Further, Secretary
Rumsfeld’s defense review may wipe out 20 percent of Army combat
units. This would make any American support to the Iraqi opposition a
highly conditional, airpower-only affair. Assembling a heavy, armored
force of even four divisions that could, if necessary, defeat Saddam’s
army and then occupy Iraq would involve not only every unit based in the
United States, but in Korea and Europe as well. The difficulties of deploying
and employing such a force would raise a risk that undoubtedly would be
a deterrent to any American president inclined to action against Iraq.
In the wake of the failure of the “smart sanctions” policy, it is increasingly difficult to countenance the fiction that Saddam Hussein remains safely “in his box.” If the Bush Administration compounds the problem by embracing a defense review that takes a regime-changing “ground option” off the table, Saddam will not only be free of the threat of removal from power, but will have little to deter him from renewed trouble-making and oppression in the region.
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