May 25, 2001

MEMORANDUM TO: OPINION LEADERS

FROM:  TOM DONNELLY, Deputy Director

SUBJECT: Defense

            Meeting with members of the House and Senate armed services committees this week, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said he was taking a “capabilities-driven” approach to restructuring the U.S. military in contrast to the traditional “threat-based” defense reviews of the past.

            Such an approach has much to recommend it.  In a world without a well-defined Soviet yardstick against which to measure U.S. forces, there is a strong argument to be made for maintaining a force able to protect the many and varied interests of the world’s sole superpower.  Individually, today’s threats -- from the Iraqi army, to ethnic cleansers in the Balkans to the Chinese navy -- represent a diffuse and complex set of problems that only begin to define the real requirements for the American military.

            But military capabilities can be no more than the means to an end, and Secretary Rumsfeld has remained quiet about the larger strategic purposes of the American military.  If he is to rebuild and reform the military, Rumsfeld must make a clear and consistent case for a force equally capable of deterring the rise of a great-power challenger, preserving the peace in key regions and shaping the world in line with American principles and interests -- the force advocated by Dick Cheney and Paul Wolfowitz in the 1992 Defense Planning Guidance.  In today’s terms, that would  entail an American military capable of carrying out four essential missions: defending the American homeland, especially against the spreading threat of ballistic missiles armed with nuclear warheads; fighting and decisively winning multiple large-scale conventional wars; providing a global military presence; and transforming U.S. conventional forces to exploit the “revolution in military affairs.” 

            In recent interviews, Secretary Rumsfeld has appeared uncertain over the course of his defense review, as though uncertain as to the purpose of U.S. military power.  Should the United States reserve itself for large wars, commit to various constabulary missions or prepare for the future?  Look toward Asia or retain focus on Europe or the Persian Gulf?  But, in fact, these are complementary aspects of America's global mission, not elements in competition.  Rumsfeld’s task is to define a larger strategic vision that ties together the disparate strains of his review, giving them order and establishing a measure by which to judge their value.

            Without a clear strategic vision of America’s role in the world, the chances for winning the required resources to rebuild and reform the military are almost nil.  The Office of Management and Budget already has proven itself hostile to increased defense spending, and the loss of Republican control of the Senate also will complicate Rumsfeld’s job.  The opportunity for revitalizing America’s defenses, which seemed so bright a few months ago, is on the verge of vanishing.